MODULE [01] · SYNARIS OS · ● STATUS: ACTIVE

AURA

BIOMETRIC HARDWARE DNA

The gate. Identity, before any data, any message, any file.

FIDO2WEBAUTHN STANDARD
Ed25519RFC 8032 SIGNED
MULTISIGNAL LIVENESS
0CLOUD DEPENDENCY
[01]

THREAT MODEL

Most enterprise authentication stacks were built for convenience. Vendors hold the keys. Vendors host the data. Vendors decide who is in and who is out. AURA was built for the opposite premise: biometric data never leaves the chip, identity proofs never leave the organization, and no third party stands between the user and the system.

THREAT VECTORMITIGATIONENFORCEMENT
Credential phishingFIDO2 platform attachment · userVerification requiredHardware-bound
Replay attackHMAC-SHA256 step token · 5min TTL · userId+timestamp boundPer-request
Session hijackSession JWT · IP + UA bound · HKDF-SHA256 derivedPer-session
Spoofing (photo/video)Multi-signal liveness · enforced thresholdEnforce mode
Biometric exfiltrationSecure Enclave / TPM · template never crosses the wireHardware
Audit tamperingSHA-256 hash chain · Ed25519 signed · append-onlyCryptographic
Vendor lock-inSingle-tenant deployment · zero external API callsArchitectural
[02]

ARCHITECTURE

AURA operates as Zone 1 in the SYNARIS sovereign architecture. The authentication perimeter sits between the external request origin and the private SYNARIS node. Biometric capture happens entirely on the user's device. The Secure Enclave produces a cryptographic signature; only that signature crosses the wire. AURA verifies, mints a session token, and writes the event to the AuditChain.

ZONE 0                 ZONE 1                          ZONE 2                       ZONE 3
EXTERNAL               AUTH PERIMETER                  SYNARIS NODE                 RESULT
─────────              ──────────────                  ────────────                 ──────
USER DEVICE  ────────► AURA ENGINE          ─────────► HUB · MY POST · NEXO  ────►  SESSION
                       JWT + IP BIND                   VAULT · IRIS · MIA           ESTABLISHED
                       HKDF-SHA256
                       NONCE 60s TTL
                       Ed25519 SIGN
                       │
                       ▼
                       AUDITCHAIN
                       SHA-256 chain
                       Ed25519 sealed
                       append-only
LAYERCOMPONENTFUNCTION
CaptureDevice Secure Enclave / TPMBiometric template storage · never exported
AttestationFIDO2 / WebAuthnPlatform authenticator · userVerification: required
LivenessMulti-signal engineDescriptor + landmark + temporal coherence + time span
TokenHMAC-SHA256 step token5min TTL · userId+timestamp bound
SessionJWT · HKDF-SHA256AES-256-GCM payload · IP + UA bound
AuditAuditChainSHA-256 hash chain · Ed25519 sealed · append-only
[03]

CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES

FUNCTIONPRIMITIVE
Biometric matchingEuclidean 128D Float32 descriptor · enforced threshold
LivenessMulti-frame temporal validation · descriptor + landmark + coherence
Step tokenHMAC-SHA256 · TTL 5min · userId+timestamp bound
Session JWTHKDF-SHA256 · AES-256-GCM payload · IP+UA bound
Message signingEd25519 (RFC 8032) · per-user keypair · WebCrypto
Audit chainAppend-only · SHA-256 hash chain · Ed25519 signed
At-rest encryptionAES-256-GCM · random IV · auth tag
WebAuthnFIDO2 · platform attachment · userVerification required
[04]

ATTACK SURFACE

AURA is designed under explicit assumption of adversarial conditions. The attack surface is enumerated, bounded, and continuously audited. The following table maps the principal vectors and the architectural property that makes the bypass non-trivial.

VECTORBYPASS COMPLEXITYARCHITECTURAL DEFENCE
Stolen passwordHIGHFIDO2 second factor · Secure Enclave required
Photo / printed faceHIGHMulti-frame temporal validation · descriptor variance
Recorded videoHIGHTemporal coherence + time-span validation
Deep-fake feed injectionVERY HIGHHardware sensor attestation · platform authenticator
Token replayVERY HIGHHMAC step token · 5min TTL · single-use
Session hijackVERY HIGHJWT IP + UA binding · HKDF-derived per-session key
Audit log tamperEXTREMEHash chain breakage detected · Ed25519 verifiable
Server-side biometric leakN/ATemplates never reach the server
[05]

COMPLIANCE

FRAMEWORKARTICLEIMPLEMENTATION
GDPRArt. 9Biometric explicit consent · BIOMETRIC_CONSENT_GRANTED audit event
GDPRArt. 13First-login privacy modal · /privacy/accept
GDPRArt. 15DSR export endpoint · /privacy/export
GDPRArt. 17VAULT delete preserves audit chain integrity
GDPRArt. 32AES-256-GCM at rest · TLS 1.3 in transit · audit trail
GDPRArt. 35DPIA approved · docs/compliance/DPIA_biometric_v1.0
NIS2SHA-256 audit chain · append-only · permanent record
eIDASEd25519 advanced electronic signature
[06]

DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS

LAYERSPECIFICATION
ArchitectureSovereign single-tenant deployment
Operating systemHardened Linux LTS
CryptographyIndustry-standard primitives · audited
NetworkTLS 1.3 · HSTS · strict CSP · intrusion prevention
TLSAutomated certificate renewal
SovereigntyZero external API · zero third-party data exposure
High availabilityMulti-node failover · roadmap Q3 2026
[07]

AUDIT TRAIL FORMAT

Every authentication event is committed to the AuditChain. Comprehensive event taxonomy continuously expanded. The chain is append-only, hash-linked, and Ed25519-sealed at each entry.

{
  "event_type": "AUTH_SUCCESS",
  "user_id": "string",
  "timestamp": 1714230000000,
  "tenant": "string",
  "prev_hash": "sha256...",
  "current_hash": "sha256...",
  "signature": "ed25519..."
}
DOCUMENT · TECHNICAL BRIEF

AURA TECHNICAL BRIEF

Full architecture, threat model, primitives and compliance specification. Ed25519-signed PDF · gated access.

CLASSIFICATION: PUBLIC · DOMAIN: CRYPTOGRAPHY